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future contract entered into during the effective period of the notice
of assignment .... -'4 If an "account" is defined as a "future right to
payment under a contract to arise in the future," and this "account"
is the subject matter of a present assignment that is protected, an
equitable lien is perfected as to the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION

The Legislature of the State of Florida has performed a great
service both to businessmen and financial institutions by enacting
chapter 524 of the Florida Statutes in its present form. The businessman can now put an otherwise idle asset to work as security for
working capital to promote expansion. The financial institution can
feel secure in accepting a properly executed assignment of accounts
receivable as collateral in advancing loans.
The statute does not replace the careful scrutiny of a prudent
credit man in selecting potential assignors of accounts; but, once a
good credit risk is discovered, strict compliance with the statute
provides maximum security.
KERMIT

G.

KINDRED

THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
FEDERAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
In certain circumstances a taxpayer under investigation by the
Internal Revenue Service can be protected by the guarantee against
self-incrimination provided by the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Investigatory procedures utilized by the Service
and the attitude assumed by some courts have curtailed its application. This makes it essential that taxpayers, and lawyers protecting
their clients' interests, have a greater awareness of the privilege and
of the requirements for its use. The scope of the privilege and the
limitations on its effective exercise are the subject of this note. The
fourth amendment, pertaining to unlawful searches and seizures,
usually goes hand in hand with the fifth amendment in this area,
but consideration here is limited to the fifth amendment.
NATURE OF THE PRIVILEGE

The fifth amendment declares that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The
44.

FLA. STAT. §524.01 (1) (a) (1959). (Emphasis added.)
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NO TES
right to claim the privilege does not depend on the nature of the
proceeding. It extends to any proceeding, civil or criminal, when
an answer might tend to subject the person giving it to criminal
responsibility.' The taxpayer may therefore refuse to testify or to
produce documents, either at trial or in preliminary examinations,
on the ground of self-incrimination.
The privilege is a purely personal right 2 and cannot be asserted by
anyone other than the person who may be incriminated. 3 Consequently, a taxpayer is not protected when the evidence is in the
hands of another unless the privileged communications doctrine4
applies.
Since the privilege is personal, a corporation cannot refuse to
produce its records, as it is not a person within the language of the
fifth amendment. 5 The officers of a corporation hold its books and
records in a representative capacity and can be required to produce
and identify them,6 even though the contents may tend to incriminate
the officers personally.7 Partnership records are personal and therefore
within the privilege, at least when the partnership is small. The availability of the privilege to large partnerships and unincorporated
associations, such as unions, depends on their characterization as
"personal," which is determined by the organization's relative size and
8
activities.
The taxpayer's cooperation is solicited in all tax fraud investigations. However, extending cooperation may be highly detrimental
to the taxpayer, as stated in Holland v. United States:9
"In many cases of this type, the prosecution relies on the
taxpayer's statements, made to revenue agents in the course of
their investigation, to establish vital links in the Government's
proof . . . . [T]he prosecution may pick and choose from the
taxpayer's statement, relying on the favorable portion and
throwing aside that which does not bolster its position."
In view of the possible damaging effect upon the taxpayer, the
privilege against self-incrimination may be most advantageously asserted at the investigative stage of tax fraud cases. Failure to exercise
1. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arnstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
2. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
3. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Singleton, 193
F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952).
4. See discussion under heading "Privileged Communications," infra.
5. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
6. United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
7. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
8. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
9. 348 U.S. 121, 128 (1954).
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the right at that time may result in waiver of the constitutional protection. 10 Even if the privilege is asserted, there are several factors
that make its effectiveness of questionable value. An understanding
of these limitations is necessary to determine the usefulness of the
protection.
THE REQUIRED RECoRDs DOCTRINE

The constitutional provision against self-incrimination was held, in
Boyd v. United States,"I to apply not only to oral testimony but also
to the production and examination of books and papers. To seize a
person's private papers and use them against him in a criminal prosecution is equivalent to compelling him to testify against himself and
is also within the prohibition of the fifth amendment. 2 The protection afforded by the Boyd doctrine, however, has been severely limited
by the removal of many types of documents from the category of
private records by the "required records doctrine." This limitation
3
developed by way of dictum in Wilson v. United States:
"The principle [that as to documents a custodian can claim
no privilege] applies not only to public documents in public
offices, but also to records required by law to be kept in order
that there may be suitable information of transactions which
are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and
the enforcement of restrictions validly established. There the
privilege, which exists as to private papers, cannot be maintained."
Such records have been said to be quasi-public, and the rule has been
applied to persons permitted by license to engage in certain regulated
4
activities on the condition that various records be maintained.2
The doctrine has been extended to individuals engaged in fairly
narrow fields that, for reasons of public welfare, were controlled by
regulatory legislation requiring maintenance of certain records. 5
In Shapiro v. United States 6 the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, held that the privilege against self-incrimination that existed
as to private papers could not be maintained in relation to records
required to be kept under Office of Price Administration regulations.
This decision firmly established that records required to be kept under
a regulatory statute are not privileged, and it represents a further
10. See discussion under heading "Waiver of the Privilege," infra.
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid.
221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
United States v. Mulligan, 268 Fed. 893 (N.D.N.Y. 1920).
See, e.g., Pulford v. United States, 155 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1946).
335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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encroachment on the "private records" doctrine of the Boyd case.
The implications of Shapiro in the tax area are many and varied,
because a taxpayer may be required to keep such records as are
necessary to determine tax liability.'7 And, since a taxpayer's records
could be used not only in the assessment of tax liability but also in
a prosecution for criminal fraud, the decision could have particular
significance for the taxpayer.
In a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, Newman v.
United States,1s the court noted that taxpayers are required to keep
certain records and that inspection thereof is authorized by the Internal Revenue Code.1 9 The court concluded that such records are
not protected by the fifth amendment.
In Beard v. United States2o it was held that the trial judge may
instruct the jury that in determining whether a defendant filed a
false tax return his refusal to produce records required by law to be
kept may be considered. Comment on a taxpayer's failure to produce
records would be permissible only if the accused were compelled to
produce them, since the self-incrimination provision forbids inferences
to be made from the non-production of privileged documents.21 An
interesting aspect of the Beard case is that, because of the importance
of the question raised, the American Bar Association filed an amicus
curiae brief on the petition for writ of certiorari, raising specifically
the question whether personal records of taxpayers are outside the
protection of the fifth amendment. In the brief submitted by the
22
Solicitor General of the United States on behalf of the Government,
the Department of Justice took the position that the Beard case did
not present that issue, since the defendant did not effectively claim
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Department of Justice
thus indicated unwillingness to test the applicability of the required
records doctrine to revenue records before the Supreme Court.
A California federal district court has held that working papers
prepared by an accountant for taxpayers are not public records within the public records exception to the privilege against self-incrimination..23 The court recognized the required records doctrine
of the Shapiro case as it pertains to records required to be kept by a
17.
18.
19.
20.
States,

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6001. "
277 F.2d 794, 797 (5th Cir. 1960).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7602.
222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); cf. Smith v. United
236 F.2d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1956).

21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
22. Brief for United States, in United States v. Beard, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
23. Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). The validity of
this decision was questioned in United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.NJ.
1959).
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valid government regulation, but as to the advisability of its applica24
tion in the tax area the court said:
"The zealous prosecution of violations of the criminal
laws is the business of the government. But the zealous protection of the liberties of the people should be equally the
concern of the government. The field of taxation represents
probably the greatest single area of contact between individuals
and the force of the state. A slight invasion of the right
against self-incrimination in this field has as great and baleful
consequences upon the relations between the individual and the
state as does an invasion of that right in the more dramatic
areas of public life."
Since the point has not been squarely tested by the Supreme Court,
there is considerable doubt concerning the status of personal income
tax records. To apply the required records doctrine in the tax field
might facilitate law enforcement, but it would result in an unjustified
invasion of the privilege against self-incrimination.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

Another ground for refusal to testify or to produce documents may
be the existence of a confidential relationship between the taxpayer
and the holder of the documents. The most universally recognized
privileged relationship is that existing between attorney and client.
The attorney must obtain from his client a complete disclosure of
the facts in order to provide adequate legal representation. Without
the protection afforded by this privilege, such a disclosure would
not be possible. However, the attorney-client privilege is not absolute.
It is limited to communications that are intended to be confidential,25
and it does not exist unless the attorney is acting in the capacity
26
of a lawyer giving legal advice.
Communications between accountant and client are not privileged.
In a fraud investigation the taxpayer's accountant can be compelled to
testify and to produce books and records in his possession.27 The
accountant may be compelled to reveal not only details of the taxpayer's business but also any admission made by him to the accountant.2 8 The Government has employed such evidence in tax
fraud investigations and prosecutions.29
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

144 F. Supp. at 103.
United States v. Teller, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1958).
McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953).
E.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mass. 1955).
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One method used to protect communications to an accountant
under the attorney-client privilege is for the attorney, rather than
the taxpayer, to hire the accountant. In Himmelfarb v. United States,30
however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
accountant could be compelled to testify even though he had been
employed by the defendant's attorney. The court stated that the
privilege applies only to third persons, such as stenographers, whose
presence is indispensable at the time the communication between
attorney and client is made. The presence of an accountant engaged by
the attorney is not indispensable but merely convenient; thus the
testimony of the accountant cannot be excluded as privileged. Disclosures to the accountant outside the presence of the taxpayer are
not privileged either, since the taxpayer is considered to have impliedly authorized his attorney to make them. It seems that an
accountant can be required to disclose his knowledge of a client's
tax liability at any stage of the investigation.
When the tax adviser is both an attorney and an accountant, the
nature of the services rendered determines whether the relationship
with the taxpayer is privileged. No attorney-client privilege exists
when the taxpayer employs an accountant who is also an attorney
but who does not function as an attorney in performing services for
the taxpayer. 31 Furthermore, the privilege does not attach to work
characteristically performed by an accountant, even though the accountant-attorney also renders legal advice based on that work.32
State statutes creating privileged relationships between accountant
and client are not applicable to federal tax investigations. In
Falsone v. United States33 the court held that the Florida statute,3 4
which establishes such a relationship, does not prevent an Internal
Revenue Service agent from compelling a certified public accountant
to testify or to produce books and papers relating to the income tax
liability of his clients. Internal Revenue investigation is an administrative process, and neither state statutes nor federal rules of evidence 35
are applicable to an inquiry conducted by a revenue agent pursuant
to code provisions.
The highly complex and technical nature of tax problems makes
a knowledge of accounting mandatory in many cases. The attorney
has the choice of muddling through an analysis of the client's
financial situation alone, a job for which he is possibly not trained,
or obtaining the professional help of an accountant. Although the
30.
31.
32.
33.

175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
OIender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).

34. FLA. STAT. §473.15 (1959).

35. In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953).
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services of an accountant may be extremely helpful, the benefits of
his assistance must be weighed against the danger of incrimination to
the client.
The rules and regulations governing practice before the Treasury
Department grant to enrolled agents who are not attorneys the same
rights, powers, and privileges as an enrolled attorney. It has been
suggested that the reasons justifying an attorney-client privilege
logically could be applied to communications between a client and
his qualified agent who is charged with the responsibilities of an
attorney. 36 Since the services rendered by an accountant representing
a taxpayer before the Treasury Department are similar to those of an
attorney, justification for the privilege exists.
Furthermore, it may be argued that when the accountant is
hired by the attorney, the accountant is an expert within the confidential relationship of attorney-client. The attorney-client privilege
has been applied to engineering experts, 3 7 patent experts,38 and doctors39 employed by the attorney as interpreters through whom the
client can communicate the facts in an intelligible manner. The
accountant is an expert in the interpretation of business books and
records; and he has been so recognized in England, where the attorney-client privilege has been held to encompass an accountant
employed by a lawyer.-, This leads to the conclusion reached by
the Committee on Procedure in Fraud Cases of the American Bar
Association-' that the Himmelfarb decision was erroneous, and that
the privilege should attach when the attorney hires an accountant in
connection with a tax fraud matter. The accountant hired by the
attorney can possibly even come within the narrow confines of the
Himmelfarb decision, since his assistance may be "indispensable" to
the proper preparation of a tax fraud case.
Any limitations on the ability of the lawyer to use an expert,
such as an accountant, impairs the lawyer's capacity to develop his
case properly. There are indications, however, that some courts
believe that the interests of the public are not effectively served by
tax specialists who are not members of the bar.4 2 This position, even
if valid, seems outweighed by the interest in not depriving a person
of effective representation.
36.

8 WIGMXO, EVmENCE §2300 (a) (3d ed. 1940).
37. Lewis v. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
38. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass.
1947).
39. City 9- County of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d

26 (1951).
40. Walsham v. Stainton, 2 Hem. 8. Mill. 1, 71 Eng. Rep. 357 (Ch. 1863).
41. A.B.A. Committee Report, Section of Taxation 112 (1953).
42. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 498, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951).
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WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE

The privilege against self-incrimination is not automatic, and
failure to invoke it will be deemed a waiver. 43 If the taxpayer fails
to assert the privilege at the proper time, he will be considered to
have waived his right; and any information obtained thereafter will
44
be construed as given voluntarily.
The waiver principle is important, inasmuch as the Internal
Revenue Service has the duty of making both civil and criminal
investigations of taxpayers in the enforcement of income tax laws.
Routine income tax examinations, which are civil investigations, are
made by "revenue agents," who are attached to the Audit Division
of the District Director's Office. When income tax fraud is suspected,
the criminal investigation is conducted by "special agents," who are
attached to the Intelligence Division of the District Director's Office.
The existence of two types of investigative agents and the difference
in their functions are not generally known or, if known, are not
understood by the average taxpayer. As a result, during the early
stages of the investigation taxpayers frequently provide the agents
with damaging evidence that they could legally withhold.
The decisions have generally held that there is no duty to warn
the taxpayer of his constitutional rights,45 and that the test of admissibility of statements is whether they are made voluntarily and
6
without compulsion.4
If a taxpayer denies a request for information the Internal Revenue
Service can require him to produce his records and to testify if the
purpose of the investigation is merely to determine a civil tax
liability.47 However, if the Service elects to issue a summons to compel production of records in the civil investigation, its policy is then
to abandon criminal prosecution, since issuance of a summons results
in an involuntary disclosure. 48 If evidence has not been submitted
voluntarily, it may be excluded by a motion to suppress or an objection to its admissibility in a criminal trial.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
44. See, e.g., Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934).
45. See, e.g., Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955).
46. E.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); Turner v. United States,
222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955); Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.
1953); United States v. Wheeler, 172 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
47. INT. REV.CODE of 1954, §§7602-05.
48. A "special agent" has thus pointed up the problem: "I told him that we
would not compel the production of those records, because if we did, it would
destroy all chances of prosecution .... We regard the issuance of a summons or
subpoena on an individual as a bar to prosecution." Testimony of David A.
Kelleker, Head, Mass. Intelligence Division, in United States v. Centracchio, Crim.
No. 52-47, D. Mass. (trial transcript, p. 152).
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However, there has been an undying impression among taxpayers,
accountants, and general legal practitioners that payment of deficiencies and penalties will forestall criminal prosecution. Taxpayers have
sacrificed constitutional rights in the belief that cooperation would
induce a recommendation against prosecution. In fact, tender of deficiencies and penalties will have little, if any, bearing on the recom49
mendation of the agent as to prosecution.
To take advantage of this willingness to cooperate and avoid
compulsory production of records and testimony as long as criminal
prosecution is still being considered, the Service can employ various
procedures either to conceal the presence of the special agent or to
misrepresent his identity and the criminal character of the investigation. The following are examples of methods that have been used
by Internal Revenue agents: (1) The revenue agent begins a routine
check, and upon later suspicion of fraud a special agent enters the
case without advising the taxpayer of the changed character of the
investigation; (2) the revenue agent fronts for, and works under, the
direction of a special agent; and (3) the revenue agent introduces the
special agent to the taxpayer as a "fellow revenue agent."
Failure to disclose the nature of the investigation may not be
sufficient to make admissions of the taxpayer involuntary, but a different situation is presented if it is coupled with deception, fraud,
50
or misrepresentation on the part of the Internal Revenue Service.
It is easy to say that statements secured through deceit and deception
are tantamount to being involuntary. The difficult problem is to
determine the degree of deception by the Government that is necessary
before a voluntary admission becomes an involuntary disclosure. The
conflicting decisions in this area clearly show that the courts are
coming to grips with the problem of whether incriminating statements are made voluntarily and are reaching different results when
similar facts are presented. 51
49. See Baiter, New Developments in Fraud and Negligence, 2 J. TAXATION 41

(1955).
50. See United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
51. For failure to disclose the criminal nature of investigation not rendering
evidence inadmissible, see Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1955).
As to the result when the special agent represents investigation to be "routine," see
United States v. Frank, 151 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (held admissible); United
States v. Wolrich, 129 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (held inadmissible). As to
evidence obtained through promises of immunity, see Centracchio v. Garrity, 198
F.2d 382 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952) (holding such evidence admissible); White v. United States, 194 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1952); In re Monroe, 110
F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1953); In re Liebster, 91 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(holding evidence obtained thereby inadmissible). For revenue agent acting under
special agent, see Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955) (holding
such evidence admissible); United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y.
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Initially it is difficult to determine whether an investigation is
civil or criminal; and if no summons is served, the taxpayer must
be careful to assert the privilege at his first point of contact with
an investigating agent.5 2 If the privilege is not asserted when the

53
records and information are first requested it has been waived.
An assertion of the privilege will be sustained even if it is not
precise in form. There is no magic formula that must be recited to
assure the protection that the amendment was intended to provide. 54
However, it has also been held that the privilege must be claimed in
no uncertain terms and in a fashion that makes it absolutely clear
that it is being asserted. 55 The courts thus have much leeway in
determining whether the privilege has been properly claimed.
The privilege can never be partially asserted. Once incriminating facts have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege
may not be asserted to withhold the details. 56 It is therefore incumbent on the taxpayer to choose at the outset of an investigation the
position he will assume. He cannot initially cooperate with the Government and thereafter contend that his constitutional rights have

been denied him, 5 7 because a voluntary offer of facts or information

is tantamount to a waiver of the privilege.5 8
Thus the taxpayer is in a dilemma. He may assert his privilege
at the first opportunity and incur the wrath and suspicion of the
Service, or he may cooperate and possibly incriminate himself.
CONCLUSION

A look at what has happened to the privilege against self-incrimination in the tax area reveals an encroachment on the basic protections
of the fifth amendment. The investigating process operates against
the taxpayer's rights; he may unknowingly waive his protection when
first called upon by the Internal Revenue agent. If the agents use
deceptive methods to get information from the taxpayer and access to
his records, the court may refuse to suppress the evidence, asserting
that to do so would destroy effective enforcement of the tax laws.
Even if the taxpayer is informed of his rights and refuses to make any
1955) (holding such evidence inadmissible).
52. Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934).
53. E.g., United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954); Morris v.
United States, 12 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1926).
54. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955); cf. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
55. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
56. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
57. Myres v. United States, 174 F.2d 329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
849 (1949).
58. Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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statements or turn over his books to the agent, his "unprivileged"
accountant may be forced to produce all books and records in his
possession. Further, the accountant can be required to testify as to
his knowledge of the taxpayer's liability. Aside from these methods,
the required records doctrine may be invoked by the court to allow
the taxpayer's books to be used against him. Taking these factors
into consideration, how much realistic protection does the taxpayer
have against incriminating himself?
The investigatory procedures in tax cases should be revised to
provide protection to the taxpayer which would not infringe upon
his constitutional rights. A special agent should make his function
clear at the outset of the investigation; failure to do so should render
any evidence obtained thereby inadmissible as involuntarily given.
If a revenue agent makes the initial investigation, it is only fair play
to require immediate notice to the taxpayer when the agent thinks
he has uncovered fraud. When the taxpayer becomes a suspected
criminal the privilege should not be waived because of earlier cooperation. Until the Internal Revenue Service adopts new investigational policies and techniques, it is incumbent upon the lawyer to
take an active role in protecting his clients during investigations,
and it is up to the courts to take a closer look at the situation in the
light of the fifth amendment.
Procedural reform by the Internal Revenue Service is not in itself
sufficient to give the taxpayer adequate protection against selfincrimination. Because of the technicalities of a tax case, an accountant may be essential to proper preparation, and he should be accorded
a privileged relationship with his client. In addition, the required
records doctrine should not be applied to income tax records, since
the use of the taxpayer's private records is equivalent to his testifying
against himself. A taxpayer must be granted all these rights if he is
to be protected from self-incrimination. Anything less would amount
to carving out "taxpayers" from the protection afforded by the
fifth amendment. It is hoped that the courts will assume their desirable
role as vigilant guardians of individual rights.
NoRMAN H. LI'OFF
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